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Abstract
European countries have progressively integrated from the point of view of trade and investment and have a common
currency now. However, labour market and fiscal institutions have largely retained their national status. The aim of this
paper is to examine:
a)  the possibility for trade unions of internalising external effects stemming from wage setting in a national context;
b)  the possibility for governments of internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from public expenditure at a
national level;
c)  the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities.
We have found a certain gain in terms of employment only when unions co-operate and we are in a regime where the
impact of domestic prices on employment through the terms of trade is higher than the impact of domestic prices on
employment through the CPI; in this case, a gain in terms also of inflation may take place.
In the case of co-operation between governments gains may accrue only in terms of employment or inflation to one or
the other country, if the weights put by the governments on price stability are different. This occurs because the central
bank, whose overriding objective is price stability, neutralises any rise in the price levels (as well as the positive effects
on employment) deriving from the rise in the government expenditures of both countries that take place as a
consequence of governments’ co-operation.
This paper partially answers recent concern for considering multi-player contexts and asymmetries in open economy
analyses. Here, in fact, several kinds of partial coalitions and the effects of asymmetries in players' preferences are
studied.
JEL codes: E62, E64, F15, F42
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1. Introduction.
European countries have progressively integrated from the point of view of trade and investment
and have a common currency now. Labour market and fiscal institutions have largely retained their
national status until now, but changes are on the way. On one side, European unions have
committed themselves to the aim of achieving increased employment and purchasing power through
cross-border co-ordination of bargaining policy (see the Doorn declaration of September 1998). On
the other side, the Lisboa European Council (March 2000) for the first time has indicated common
targets in terms of growth and employment. This, while allowing for co-operation of fiscal
authorities respectful of the Growth and Stability Pact
2, raises the question of a possible conflict
with the pre-eminent objective of the European Central Bank, i.e., the price stability.
In more general terms there are a number of policy questions that involve interactions between
the different institutions operating in a monetary union such as the European Monetary Union.
Among them there are the following ones:
a)  the possibility for trade unions of internalising external effects stemming from wage setting
in a national context;
b)  the possibility for governments of internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from
public expenditure at a national level;
c)  the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities.
Question under a) has to do with the (dis)advantages of various levels of centralised bargaining,
from complete decentralisation to complete centralisation. These have been the object of an
extensive literature at least since Bruno, Sachs (1985) and Tarantelli (1986)
3, but mainly in a
closed-economy setting. Calmfors, Driffill (1988) and others emphasise the effects of the degree of
centralisation of wage bargaining
4. According to Calmfors and Driffill, there is wage restraint in
economies with an extreme degree of decentralisation or centralisation. Complete decentralisation
(wage bargaining at the firm level) would ensure a nominal wage restraint and a higher employment
level through the effects of competition between unions. The foundation of co-operative wage
determination or complete centralisation, i.e. wage bargaining at the level of the whole national
area, derives from the possibility to internalise the effects of wage setting at the level of each single
region, industry or firm on the consumer price index (CPI) of all the regions, industries or firms of
the national economy. This would have the same result as complete decentralisation on wages and
employment.
External effects of wage setting at a national level have the same foundation as those stemming
from bargaining at a lower (sub-national) level. In wage setting at a national level perception of the
inflationary consequences for a wider than national area is limited and unions tend to be aggressive,
since they can beggar-their-neighbour. This is a powerful argument in favour of international wage
co-operation. It is important to note, however, that international co-operation between unions – as
distinct from their co-operation at a national level – introduces a new dimension, since unions no
longer face, as they do in a national context, a single policy maker, the government, or a couple of
policy makers, the government and the central bank. In fact there are a multiplicity of policy-
makers: at least two governments and one or more central banks
5. This complicates the picture and
                                                                
2 In an integrated monetary union with positive international spillovers of expenditure, limits to budget deficit can be
satisfied at different levels of public expenditure in the member countries according to whether fiscal policy is co-
ordinated or not.
3 Tarantelli (1986) was published posthumous. Tarantelli’s ideas on the advantages of centralisation in wage bargaining
were laid down at least as back as 1982 (see Cukierman, Lippi, 1999). Conditions for the validity of Tarantelli’s
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4 More recent contributions are Bleaney (1996), Skott (1997), Velasco, Guzzo (1999), Cukierman, Lippi (1999). Rama
(1994), Corneo (1995), Soskice, Iversen (1998), Grüner, Hefeker (1999) have extended the analysis to an open
economy.
5 This point is overlooked by Cukierman, Lippi (2000), who pretend to consider an international setting whereas their
model considers a multiplicity of unions and a single monetary authority, with no other (national) policy-maker.3
can lead to different outcomes. Zervoyianni (1997) considers a two-country model with unions and
governments and shows that: i) union co-operation still improves welfare; ii) co-operation between
the unions and the governments of individual countries may fail to produce Pareto improvements.
In this paper we intend to enlarge the number of policy makers involved to include both
governments and the central bank
6.
Question under b) has been extensively examined in the economic literature on the advantages of
international co-operation, but less so in a monetary union context, where co-operating national
governments face a single monetary authority. Fiscal policy co-operation may be founded on the
existence of negative or positive spillovers. When there are negative spillovers co-ordination leads
to a reduction in government expenditure, whereas positive spillovers imply increased government
expenditure in the co-ordinated case, if there are nominal inertia (see Mundell, 1968; Hamada,
1985; Svensson, 1987; van der Ploeg, 1993). Dixon, Santoni (1997) have recently shown that
positive spillovers from government expenditure arise in a monetary union with unemployment, a
fixed money supply and unionised labour markets. One of the purposes of this paper is to analyse
whether the outcome is similar to Dixon and Santoni’s in a setting with an active central bank and
the possibility of centralised wage setting, which adds questions a) and c) to question b). In our
analysis a simple model, inspired to Gylfason and Lindbeck (1986), is bent to the specificities of a
monetary union where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate directly.
To keep algebra simple, only two countries are considered, some variables are assumed to be
constant
7 and the assumption of symmetry as between the two countries is introduced. Many
relevant questions arise when symmetry is not satisfied, but we want to stick to an assumption of
symmetry to highlight the questions indicated.
In section 2 we present the model (derived in Appendix) A; in section 3 non-cooperative
solutions are obtained. The effects of fiscal policy co-operation and co-operation between unions
are examined in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Simultaneous co-operation between unions and
governments is the object of section 6, whereas co-operation between governments and the central
bank is examined in section 7. The final section presents a summary and conclusions.
2. The model.
Three types of agents (firms, unions, and fiscal authorities) operate in each country and a single
central bank for the whole integrated area, which is a closed economy, sets the nominal interest rate,
r. Since there is perfect mobility of financial capital
8, the interest rate is the same in both countries.
Each country is specialised in the production of one good (or one basket of goods). Goods are
imperfect substitutes. There is perfect competition between firms within each country, but imperfect
competition as between firms operating in the two countries. Firms are profit maximisers and
unions set monopoly wages in each country (if they do not act co-operatively) or for the whole area
(if they co-operate). Governments set the balanced budget level of public expenditure in each area
in a co-operative or non-co-operative way. Wages, budget levels and the interest rate are set
simultaneously.
                                                                
6 To be fair, Zervoyianni considers governments whose preference functions are quadratic in both employment and
inflation. This might have the same outcome as considering both governments, whose predominant objective is
employment, and a central bank, having inflation as its overriding target. One of the purposes of this paper is to check
the validity of such a correspondence.
7 The strongest of these assumptions is that of a constant composition of the CPI basket in the two countries. This
assumption is however common in the literature (e.g., see Sauernheimer, 1984; Monticelli, 2000)
8 We do not consider the implications of allowing firms to be mobile as between the two countries.4
Our baseline framework is an IS-AS model
9. The model, which is derived in Appendix A,
consists of two equations for each country. All variables are in logs.
ni = -s (r-p
e
i) + agi + bgj - t (pi - pj)  [1]
ni = (pi-wi)   [2]
nj = -s (r-p
e
j) + agj + bgi - t (pj - pi)  [3]
nj = (pj-wj)  [4]
vi = (1-h) pi + h pj    [5]
vj = (1-h) pj + h pi     [6]
where i and j denote the two countries, n is employment; p is the price of the composite commodity,
g is public expenditure, w is the wage rate, p
e is the expected inflation rate, v is the consumer price
index, or CPI. The expected rate of inflation is reasonably defined as E t-1 vt - vt-1 (see Preston,
Pagan, 1982, p.296). Furthermore, perfect foresight and an initial price parametrically set equal to
zero are assumed. Thus E t-1vt=vt and p
e = vt hold. Since our model is deterministic, the assumption
of perfect foresight is equivalent to that of rational expectations
10.
The two economies work in a symmetric way. Asymmetry in the working of the two economies
does not need to be stressed for the purposes of this paper. It can however be easily introduced
11. In
addition, a kind of asymmetry might arise because of possibly different preferences of unions and
governments (see eqns. [12] and [13] below),
Equation [1] and [2] represent IS and AS in country  i; equation [3] and [4] IS and AS in
country  j. Following recent literature, we take the nominal interest rate as the instrument of
monetary policy, as opposed to a monetary supply aggregate
12. This dispenses us with specifying a
money market equilibrium condition (i.e., an LM curve; see Walsh, 1998, p.214). Such a model can
be justified on three grounds at least. First, for reasons of tractability: getting rid of the money
market simplifies the very cumbersome algebra of our model. A second justification lies in our
purpose not to fix a natural level of unemployment and emphasise the possible role of unions and
other agents instead. A third justification is in the fact that the European Central Bank does indeed
set the nominal interest rate. (However, we cannot replicate in our model the very complex effects
on real variables of setting the nominal interest rate, in particular, through expectations, and then its
only influence on prices is through the activity level).
Demand is decreasing in the real interest rate (as an effect of the saving-investment behaviour by
the private sector) and the product prices differential (competitiveness effects on foreign trade). It
increases in home public expenditure and foreign public expenditure (exports). The latter is a
shortcut, with no loss of generality, to spillovers from country j to country i taking place through
country j’s imports. Equation [2] is a standard supply representation for profit-maximising firms.
Equations [5] and [6] define consumer price indexes. CPIs are weighted averages of prices of
domestic and foreign goods. h is a function of the degree of openness. As customary, we assume
h < ½.
                                                                
9 The model can also be seen as a two-country static variant of the dynamic ‘new Keynesian model’, also known in the
literature as the “optimizing IS/LM model” (McCallum, Nelson, 1997; Clarida, Gali, Gertler, 1999) adapted to the case
where the unions act at the same time as other agents.
10  We are aware of the fact that our assumptions about expectations can lead to specific results. We are however
interested in showing the possibility of outcomes different from those derived in the literature. Such a possibility would
also arise in our model with assumptions about expectations different from those of this paper.
11 Introduction of a different productivity as between countries would be of specific interest from the point of view of
the co-operation of unions whose members differ as to their productivity.
12 Bernanke, Blinder (1992) and Goodfriend (1991), among others, have emphasised the role of the Federal Funds rate –
the rate on overnight interbank loans – as an instrument of monetary policy in US. See De Arcangelis, Di Giorgio
(1998) for similar results in the Italian case; Bernanke, Mihov (1997) for the German case; and Clarida, Gali, Gertler
(1998) for a complete international comparison of several countries’ monetary policies.5
Solving the previous system of equations, we obtain the reduced form of the model:
ni = - A0 r + E1 gi + E2 gj - (1-A1) wi + A2 wj  [7]
vi = - A0 r + D1 gi + D2 gj + B1 wi + B2 wj    [8]
nj = - A0 r + E2 gi + E1 gj + A2 wi - (1-A1) wj  [9]
vj = - A0 r + D2 gi + D1 gj + B2 wi + B2 wj [10]
where: A 0=s/(1-s);  A1=(1-s+t+hs)/[(1-s)(1-s+2t+2hs)] >  A2=(t+hs)/[(1-s)(1-s+2t+2hs)];
A1 > B1=(1-h)A1+hA2 > B2=hA1+(1-h)A2 > 0; E1=(aA1+bA2) > E2=(aA2+bA1); D1=(1-h)E1+hE2 >
D2=hE1+(1-h)E2 > 0.
Parameters: A0, A1, A2, are the elasticities of the domestic price with respect to the nominal
interest rate, nominal domestic wage, nominal foreign wage, respectively. Therefore, (1+A0), (1-A1)
and (1-A2) are the elasticities of the real interest rate, the real domestic wage, the real foreign wage
rate with respect to the nominal interest rate, the nominal domestic wage and the nominal foreign
wage, respectively. In other words, for example, if the nominal interest rate increases by one point,
the real interest rate increases by 1- (-A0) = 1+A0, where 1 is the effect on the real interest rate of
the rise in the nominal interest rate and A0 is the effect of prices reduction (induced by the rise in the
nominal interest rate).
Before starting the analysis of regimes, the reader should note two facts. First, all the above
defined elasticities are the reduced form elasticities; therefore, these elasticities include direct and
feedback effects of each control variable on output and the CPI (i.e., an increase in public
expenditure affects output not only directly, but also indirectly, since it implies a reduction in the
domestic production price, the real wage and the real interest rate - E1 summarises all these effects).
Secondly, the elasticity of investment to the nominal interest rate increases in  s, but when  s
tends to one the elasticity tends to be infinite. When s = 0 (s = 1), investment is inelastic (infinitely
elastic) to the nominal interest rate. When  s >1, setting higher nominal interest rates raises
employment and reduces prices. In this paper s˛(0,1) is reasonably assumed.
Five different regimes are possible according to the values of the two parameters hv = (1-B1) and
hp = (1-A1)
13. The former is the elasticity of the real wage to the nominal wage (when the real wage
is calculated on the basis of the CPI). The latter is the elasticity of the real wage (and employment,
since [2]  and [4] hold) to the nominal wage (when the real wage is calculated on the basis of
production prices).
When hv and hp are both positive, unions raise real wages by rising nominal wages at the cost of
a lower employment level (standard trade-off regime).
When hv is positive and hp is negative, unions benefit from a complementarity between real
wages and employment. This complementarity arises because of the wedge between the real wage
(calculated in terms of the CPI) relevant for the unions and the real wage (calculated in terms of
production prices) relevant for the firm (wage-wedge externality regime).
When hv and hp are both negative, by definition of these elasticities, an increase in nominal
wages causes a more than proportional increase in v and p, and then a reduction in the real wage
both in terms of production prices and the CPI. In this regime unions can raise real wages by
reducing nominal wages. Employment however is still a decreasing function of real wages
(‘perverse’ trade-off regime).
When hp is equal to zero, nominal wage increases lead to proportional increases in production
prices, leaving the real wage rate (in terms of the latter variable) unchanged. Unions can thus pursue
only an objective of real wages (in terms of CPI) (fixed employment regime).
When hv is equal to zero, nominal wage increases lead to proportional increases in CPI, leaving
unchanged the real wage rate in terms of the latter variable. Unions could raise their satisfaction
                                                                
13 Four regimes are ruled out by the assumption hv < hp (or B1 <A1).6
only by raising the employment level which would compel them to set nominal wages at an extreme
value, in order to guarantee maximum employment (fixed real wage regime). This regime is thus of
no interest for our purposes
14.
The reader should also note that government expenditure of each country has positive (negative)
spillovers on the employment (price) level of the other country.
We consider a simultaneous policy game between the central bank, national governments and
national unions. These players maximise the following utility functions:
( ) ( )
2 1
2
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where M is the utility function of the central bank, Sk and Uk are those of the government and the
union of the k country, respectively; nk
g and wk
u are government k’s and union  k’s bliss points,
respectively.
Justifications for the use of these preference functions can be found in the relevant literature. We
want to depict a situation where there are three types of institutions, unions, governments and a
central bank, each caring for a different target in a pre-eminent way. We admit a multiplicity of
objectives for each type, but we consider as more interesting (and realistic, with reference to the
European context) the case where the relevance of different targets for each institution is not the
same, which, translated into analytic terms, implies using a quadratic form for the primary objective
and a linear form for the secondary one
15. In any case the symmetry of the semilinear form in the
preference functions of the central bank and the governments tends to stress the difference in the
pre-eminent objective of the two institutions. The central bank’s preference function, linear in
employment and quadratic in the price level, emphasises the weight often put on inflation by this
institution (as it is in the case of the European Central Bank). Priority given to employment by
governments justifies a preference function quadratic in employment (and linear in inflation) and is
consistent with a situation, like the one emerging in the past months in Europe, after the Lisboa
meeting. The specification of unions’ preference function, linear in employment and quadratic in
the real wage, similarly emphasises the weight put on the latter variable by this institution in
European labour markets; there is no apparent need to include inflation (or the price level) as an
additional argument, as some authors (see Gylfason, Lindbeck, 1994) would suggest – in order to
take account of effects that would occur in a realistic open economy (when a closed economy is
actually modelled) – since we have considered two integrated countries: any negative consequence
on employment resulting from a too aggressive wage policy is built in the working of an open
economy such as the one depicted in our structural model
16.
                                                                
14 All regimes are possible. As can be easily checked, hv and hp are positive for values of s close to zero. Both are
increasing in the degree of openness of the economy (captured by h and t) and decreasing in s˛(0,1). Moreover, when
s rises, hv becomes negative after hp and both become negative for values of s smaller than ½. Hence for s˛[½,1) we
are always in the perverse trade-off regime. For values of s˛(0,½), given the degree of openness of the economy, we
can be in one of the five regimes according to the size of s: For values of s close to zero the standard trade-off regime
is more plausible while for values of  s closer to ½ the  perverse trade-off regime becomes more plausible; for
intermediate values of s˛(0,½), the wage-wedge externality regime holds (if h>0); the other two regimes occur when
switching from one regime to another. For more details on the regimes see Appendix B.
15 See Hughes Hallett, Rees (1983), Blinder (1997). The alternative of differentiating the marginal rate of substitution
between the two objectives for the three types of institutions in functions quadratic in all their common arguments does
not have the same implications (unless extreme values of the marginal rate of substitution are chosen), since it would
not introduce a rank between the objectives.
16 In addition, critical remarks to such an argument are raised by Acocella, Ciccarone (1997).7
3. Non-co-operative solutions
Nash non-co-operative solutions are obtained by solving the system of equations derived from
agents’ maximisation problems. Each player maximises its preference function (equation [11] or
equation [12] or equation [13]) with respect to its control variable, i.e. the nominal interest rate for
the central bank, the nominal wage rate in each country for each union and the public expenditure in
each country for each government.
Solving the central bank problem yields the following first order condition:









The solutions of the unions’ problems in the two countries yield the following FOCs:
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Expressions similar to [19], [20] and [21] hold for country j.
According to [21], the union in i gets a real wage equal to its bliss point up to an amount whose
sign is positive or negative according to the sign of hp/hv.
The standard proposition of monetary policy neutrality holds (i.e., the employment level in the
two countries does not depend on the weight assigned by the central bank to employment)
17.
                                                                
17 On circumstances affecting non-neutrality in games involving monopoly unions see Acocella, Ciccarone (1997) and,
more recently, Cukierman, Lippi (1999), Lippi (1999), Ciccarone, Marchetti (2000).8
If hp = 0 (fixed employment regime), i.e. if there are no effects of nominal wages on employment,










u, the employment level is – w
u in both countries.
If hp/hv <0 (wage-wedge regime), the real wage is higher and employment is lower than in the
previous case. If the indicated assumptions of symmetry of the preference functions between the
two countries hold, the level of inflation, v, is dependent only on the central bank’s preference for
employment (a standard inflation bias is present). In this regime each union tends to gain from the
positive effect on employment of a nominal wage rise (the complementarity is generated by the real
wage-wedge). However, since unions act in a non co-ordinated way, they are not able to achieve the
(Pareto) efficient real wage.
If hp/hv >0 (both standard and perverse trade-off regimes), the level of real wages is lower and
the employment level is higher than in the previous case
18. Here again, if the indicated assumptions
of symmetry of the preference functions between the two countries hold, the level of inflation, v, is
dependent only on the central bank’s preference for employment (a standard inflation bias is also
present).
Let us consider the standard trade-off regime (hp/hv >0) further. It occurs when both hp and hv
are positive. Each union tries to maximise its preference function by raising its nominal wage. In
doing so it considers employment losses, but it does not take account of the negative externality on
the other country’s real wage. This turns out to be a sort of wage illusion, not because of the central
bank’s reaction, but as an effect of a similar choice – and illusion – on the side of the other
country’s union. The two unions are really involved in a prisoner’s dilemma game; they set a
nominal wage which corresponds to a real wage higher than the (Pareto) efficient one.
The perverse trade-off regime holds when both hp and hv are negative. In this case each union
tries to reach its optimal real wage by nominal wage reduction. Country i’s union tries to beggar its
neighbour fellow by decreasing its own nominal wage rate, hoping that this policy guarantees, on
one side, a higher real wage (though a more than proportional reduction in the price level) and a
higher employment (through the terms of trade effect), on other side
19. This, however, again turns
out to be a sort of wage illusion as an effect of a similar choice – and illusion – by country j’s union.
The two unions are again involved in a prisoner’s dilemma.
4. Fiscal policy co-operation
The central bank and unions maximisation problems are the same as those analysed in the above
section. Governments instead maximise the following common utility preference:
S
C = ½Si + ½Sj [22]
Solution of the governments’ problems yields the following FOCs:


























                                                                
18 The two regimes have equal effect on employment and real wage, but differ in the value of nominal wages.
19 Consider that these two effects depend on the values of t and h, respectively.9
We obtain the equilibrium values of employment and the CPIs by solving the system ([14], [15],







































The values of gains from co-operation accruing to country i (in terms of the specific objectives
and not of satisfaction) can be obtained by subtracting the values of non-co-operative solutions from


































i = 0 [30]
Similar expressions hold for country j.
Co-operation has an effect on employment and consumer prices only if governments have
different objectives. In this case each government can exchange one objective for the other and
(presumably) raise its satisfaction level. The government whose preference for price stability is
higher can achieve a higher level of employment when it co-operates with the other government
(since, in this case, it would share the latter’s preferences, which are more employment-oriented),
while the other government can achieve a lower level of inflation, through international co-
operation.
The reason why co-ordination affects the outcomes of the game only if there is a difference on
the weights put by the governments on price stability lies in the opposition of the pre-eminent
objectives of the governments (employment) and the central bank (price stability): the latter reacts
to a co-ordinated rise in government expenditure in the two countries, which results in higher levels
not only of employment but also of prices in both countries. To preserve price stability the central
bank raises the interest rate, thus completely neutralising the rise in employment and prices induced
by the governments’ action.
This can be seen if we express the levels of wi and wj as a function of r, gi and gj in the FOCs of
the unions and substitute them into the reaction function of the central bank [14]: we get






















By totally differentiating [7] and [9], considering [32]
20 and assuming d(wi-wj) = 0, we have
d(ni+nj) = 0. This means that the positive effect on employment of raising government expenditures
is exactly compensated by the effect on the same variable of the rise in the interest rate operated by
the central bank as a reaction to the higher level of government expenditures deriving from
governments’ co-operation.
Contrary to conclusions drawn by Dixon, Santoni (1997), positive spillovers from government
expenditure no longer arise in a monetary union with an active central bank.
5. Co- -operation between unions.
In this section, we assume that unions act co-operatively, by maximising the following function:
U
C = ½Ui  + ½Uj [33]
The central bank and the governments behave as described by [14] and [17]-[18], respectively.
FOCs for country i and j are:
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The equilibrium solutions in this case are obtained by solving the equation system given by































=---+--++ Œœ + ºß
[37]















Similar results can be obtained for country j.
The gains from co-operation accruing in terms of policy objectives can be obtained by
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[41]
Since A1-A2  > 0, employment is higher (lower) than in the non-co-operative case, if hv > 0
(hv < 0). Correspondingly, inflation is lower (higher) than in the non co-operative case in the
country whose union has a higher (lower) preference for employment, i.e., a higher (lower) qk.
Consider that the case qi=qj, hv < 0 and |hv| < B2 can never be an optimal solution for the unions
(since both real wages and employment decrease). From the point of view of a social planner (the
government) interested in both employment and price stability, the outcome of unions’ co-operation
is ambiguous in general. If, however, we consider the case where qi=qj and hv > 0, unions’ co-
operation has an unambiguous positive effect on social welfare in each country.
The real wage differs from that in the non-co-operative case. Now each union considers the
effects of its actions on the utility of its homologue. Therefore, the equilibrium real wage depends
on the preferences of both unions.  The real wage is always lower than in non-co-operative case, if
hv>0. Moreover, if both unions put the same emphasis on employment and hv<0 the real wage is
higher (lower) than in non-co-operative case, if |hv| > B2 (|hv| < B2).
These results are worth commenting in the light of the hump-shaped hypothesis suggested by
Calmfors, Driffill (1988). In their analysis there are two opposing forces (competition and
consideration of effects of wage changes on the CPI) which determine the outcome of wage
bargaining. The same two forces operate in our model at an international level. They are expressed
by the elasticity of the real wage to the nominal wage, hv , whose value depends on parameters t (an
indicator of the impact of domestic prices on employment through the terms of trade), on one side,
and (1-h) (the impact of domestic prices on employment through the CPI), on the other side
21.
However, these parameters are built in the structure of the economy and do not change according to
the level of wage bargaining. Centralisation of wage bargaining (at an international level) leads to a
reduction in nominal and real wage rates only if these parameters take appropriate values. Then our
model can be interpreted as a way to demonstrate that the intuition of Calmfors and Driffill as to the
two forces determining the outcome of bargaining in terms of wage and employment holds only in
certain regimes (in our terms, the standard trade-off regime and the wage-wedge regime). From this
point of view our results are different also from Zervoyianni’s (see Zervoyianni, 1997), who finds
an unambiguous positive effect on employment from wage-setting co-operation in an international
context.
6. Simultaneous co- -operation between unions and governments.
The solution that derives from the simultaneous co-operation of governments, on one side, and
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21 The reader should note that ¶hv/¶t > 0 and ¶hv/¶(1-h) < 0.12































Similar expressions hold for the other country.
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[47]
The real wage is the same of previous section, it is lower than in the non-co-operative case, if
hv>0. If this condition holds and the governments put the same emphasis on prices, the employment
level is certainly higher than in the non-co-operative case. A price level different than in the non-co-
operative case can result only if the preference of unions as to the real wage and those of
governments as to inflation are different.
Notice that [45] is the sum of [28] and [36], whereas [46] is the sum of [29] and [37]. This
implies that there are no cross institutional externalities; i.e. there are no further gains from co-
operation between governments and unions than those that can accrue in the case of co-operation
between either governments or unions.
7. Simultaneous co- -operation between central bank and governments.
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Similar expressions hold for the other country.
Gains from co-operation between central bank and between governments are as follows:
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i wv D-= [54]
These are the same outcomes derived in the case of government co-operation, except for the
inflation bias, which is reduced by the second term on the right hand side of [53].
8. Summary and conclusions.
In this paper, we have analysed the effects of co-operation between unions and/or governments in a
common-currency area.
We have found the possibility of a gain in terms of employment when unions co-operate if we
are in a regime where the impact of domestic prices on employment through the terms of trade is
higher than the impact of domestic prices on employment through the CPI.
Our model can be interpreted as a way to demonstrate that the intuition of Calmfors and Driffill
(1988) as to the two forces determining the outcome of bargaining in terms of wage and
employment holds only in certain regimes (in our terms, the standard trade-off regime and the
perverse trade-off regime). From this point of view our results also differ from Zervoyianni (1997),
who finds an unambiguous positive effect on employment from wage-setting co-operation in an
international context.
In the case of co-operation between governments only, gains may derive in terms of employment
or inflation to one or the other country, if the weights put by governments on price stability are
different.  From this point of view our results differ from Dixon, Santoni (1997), who find positive
spillovers from government expenditure. In the case of co-operation between governments their
attempt to raise expenditure and the employment level is neutralised by the central bank aiming at
price stability.
Our next task is to check how robust these findings are with respect to different preference
functions of the agents involved and to different hypotheses of co-operation, e.g., co-operation
between a government and a union of the same country.14
Appendix A. Explanation and derivation of the model.




In order to maximise profits, firms hire labour up to the point at which real wages are equal to the
marginal product of labour. Therefore, setting the marginal product of labour equal to the real wage,
taking logs and rearranging yields the demand for labour.
ni = -r (wi-pi) + ln(d)/(1-d) + k r = 1/(1-d) > 1.
As is customary, we put ln(d)/(1-d) + k = 0, with no loss of generality.
According to the production function, employment is a decreasing function of the real wage.
The log representation of the IS curve is
22:
ni = -a (r-pi
e) + b gi - c ti  + d gj + z (pj-pi)
Where, a, b, c, d and z are IS coefficients. All of them are functions of the marginal propensity to
import and to save. Employment decreases in the nominal interest rate (investment expenditure);
taxation (on consumption); and product prices differential (competitiveness effects). It increases in
home public expenditure and foreign public expenditure (through exports).
The balanced budget condition is the following: Gi = Ti Ni
q where q is the elasticity of taxation with
respect to employment. In logs it becomes: gi = ti + q ni
Therefore, the log representation of the IS curve with a balanced budget is:
ni = - (ar-pi
e) + bgi - c(gi-qni) + dgj + v(pj-pi)












where we assume b > c, cq < 1 and d < b-c.
The structural form of the model can then be expressed in the following way:
ni = -s' (r-pi
e) + a'gi + b'gj + t'pj - t' pi
ni = r (pi-wi) 
nj = -s' (r-pj
e) + a'gj + b'gi + t'pi - t' pj
nj = r (pj-wj)
where s' = a/(1-cq); a' =  (b-c)/(1-cq); b' = b/(1-cq); and t' = v/(1-cq).
Then dividing by r, we obtain:
ni = -s (r-pi
e) + agi + bgj + t (pj-pi)
ni = (pi-wi) 
nj = -s (r-pj
e) + agj + bgi + t (pi- pj)
nj = (pj-wj),
where unmarked parameters are the marked parameters divided by  r: e.g., s = s'/r and the
employment is now normalised for r.
                                                                
22 We express it directly in terms of ni, instead of yi. Since yi = d ni + (1-d) k (i.e. log-production function), we can do
this and incorporate d in the parameters of the IS curve. 15
Appendix B
Standard trade-off regime (A0 < A2)
§  hv = 1-B1 > 0 or B2 > A0
§  hp = 1-A1 > 0 or A2 > A0
This regime holds for low values of s and for high values of t and h. This is the common textbook
case: increases in nominal wage in one country raise real wages (in terms of both CPI and producer
prices) and unemployment; reductions in nominal interest rate raise prices and employment.
Wage-wedge regime (A2 < A0 < B2)
§  hv = 1-B1 > 0 or B2 > A0
§  hp = 1-A1 < 0 or A2 < A0
This regime holds when the foreign component in the consumption basket is (relatively) high and
the elasticity of employment to the terms of trade is (relatively) low; i.e. it is more likely to occur
when t is small and h is large. The lower is t and the higher is h, then the higher is the distance
between A2 and B2, and (since A0 does not depend on  t and h) for a given  s the higher is the
probability that A0 lies in between A2 and B2.  However, since it depends on the wedge between the
real wage in terms of CPI and the real wage in terms of production prices, when  h=0 it never
occurs. This regime might be the case of a developed country whose consumption basket has a large
foreign content whereas the degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods is rather
low, as an effect of either oligopolistic strategies or the specialisation of the two countries. In this
regime increases in nominal wages in one country decrease real wages in terms of producer prices
in that country (firms are not restrained from rising the prices of their products more than
proportionally, since t is low), but tend to increase real wages in terms of CPI: notwithstanding the
more than proportional increase in production prices, the impact of nominal wage increases on the
CPI is low, since h is high.
Perverse trade-off regime (A0 > B2) 
§  hv = 1-B1 < 0 or B2 < A0
§  hp = 1-A1 < 0 or A2 < A0
This regime is characterised by a very high sensitivity of prices and employment to the nominal
interest rate. The sensitivity is, in fact, captured by  A0 (and thus by  s). For s > ½ this regime
always occurs while, if s < ½, the regime occurs when the economy is (relatively) closed (low
values of t and h).
Fixed-employment regime (A0 = A2) )
§  hp = 1-A1 = 0 or A1 = A0
In this regime, nominal wage increases lead to proportional increases in production prices, leaving
the real wage rate in terms of the latter variable unchanged.
Fixed-real wage regime (A0 = B2)
§  hv = 1-B1 = 0 or A0 = B2
In this regime, nominal wage increases lead to proportional increases in the CPI, leaving the real
wage rate in terms of the latter variable unchanged.16
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